Jury Improperly Rejected Insanity Defense, Multiple Arson Convictions Reversed

Payne v. State, No. 20S-CR-313 (Ind. 5/18/20)

In 2005, Jesse Payne was charged with 2 counts of arson and one count of attempted arson for burning or attempting to burn down 3 of Parke County’s covered bridges, and was alleged to be a habitual offender.  Payne was found incompetent to stand trial and spent 11 years undergoing competency restoration services until he was deemed competent in 2016.  Payne had first received mental health treatment when he was 13 and had frequent psychiatric hospitalizations and involuntary commitments and has been treated with numerous powerful medications.  In 2000, he was diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which has caused a consistent pattern of hallucinations and delusional episodes.  At trial, all 3 court-appointed experts testified that Payne was legally insane at the time of the arsons.  The State attempted to rebut this with demeanor evidence from around the time of the crimes, including that Payne had acted late at night to avoid detection, that he had lied to police about why he had fuel found in his car, and his attempt to present an alibi to police by showing them convenience store receipts from around the time of the fires.  Payne was convicted and sentenced to a total of 90 years.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court has now reversed, holding by a 3-2 vote that there was insufficient evidence to rebut Payne’s insanity defense.  The Court distinguished its earlier holding in Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997 (Ind. 2018), where the Court, also by a 3-2 vote (but with very different vote lineups) affirmed a jury’s rejection of an insanity defense.  Here, unlike in Barcroft, the majority found no reason to discount the 3 experts’ opinion of Payne’s insanity; i.e., there was no evidence of “discrepancies in diagnosis, no deficiency in evaluations, and no other substantive issues with the experts’ opinion.”  Additionally, unlike Barcroft, Payne presented evidence of having well-documented, longstanding, and severe mental illness or illnesses.  Even after he was deemed competent to stand trial, his “delusional worldview persisted.”  The unanimous expert testimony, plus the evidence of longstanding serious mental illness, “fully undermines the probative value of any relevant demeanor evidence.”  The majority was quick to note, however, that a finding of insanity is not necessarily a “‘get out of jail free’ card,” as the prosecutor was required on remand to seek Payne’s immediate involuntary commitment under Ind. Code 35-36-2-4(a).  The majority also observed that Indiana law imposes no time limit on an involuntary commitment, so long as public safety requires it and potentially even after the defendant regains sanity.

Bail for Child Battery Offenses Reduced from $250,000 Cash-Only to $0

Yeager v. State, No. 20A-CR-121 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/5/20)

Some of you may have seen this opinion reported by IPAC’s Dan Miller in his Evidence-Based Decision-Making newsletter but wanted to mention it here too.  John Yeager was charged with F3 battery on a child under 14, F3 domestic battery, and F3 neglect of a dependent, for allegedly severely battering his girlfriend’s 2-year-old son.  The trial court set bail at $250,000 cash.  Yeager’s IRAS-PAT report showed a score of “zero” and recommended that he be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring.  The next day, Yeager filed a motion to reconsider bail and reduce his bond.  At the hearing, Yeager testified that he was a lifelong resident of the area, that he had resided in the same house, which he was buying, for 12-13 years, that he was employed at a job which was still available should he be released, and that his only criminal record was an underage drinking violation when he was 20 years old.  His mother testified that she and his father would make sure he made his court appearances.  The prosecution presented photographs of the child’s injuries, a physician’s opinion that the injuries were not accidental, and evidence that the child was in Yeager’s care when the injuries occurred.  The trial court denied Yeager’s motion because the nature of the offense was severe and Yeager faced a lengthy sentence, and the court was not confident Yeager did not present a risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in setting Yeager’s bond at $250,000.00 cash only.  It cited as support substantial mitigating factors showing that Yeager recognized the court’s authority, his lack of criminal record other than the single underage drinking offense, his lack of failures to appear, his stable residence in the area, his employment, and the fact he was paying off his house.  It found that the seriousness of his offenses did not equate to risk to not appear, and it specifically cited the pretrial officer’s release recommendation.  As to danger to the community, the Court found that besides the accusations in the criminal complaint, the State presented no evidence that the defendant presented a danger to anyone.  Considering the child’s injuries violated the constitutional presumption of innocence, the Court ordered Yeager’s immediate release and that he be placed on electronic monitoring as a condition of bail.

The AG has filed a petition to transfer in this case, and IPAC has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of transfer.  It is not clear that the opinion is consistent with existing case law, as well as guidance that has been given on Ind. Criminal Rule 26 and the proper scope and application of IRAS-PAT.  In light of this opinion, and regardless of whether the transfer is granted, when arguing these kinds of cases, a prosecutor should argue that the gravity of the offense impacts the defendant’s “risk of nonappearance,” Ind. Code 35-33-8-4(b)(7), in addition to the risk to public safety. When arguing risk to public safety, a prosecutor should list those specific factors in the crime that makes this defendant a risk to another individual or to public safety (even though the court in Yeager has said the circumstances of the crime are not relevant). Finally, the prosecutor should encourage the judge to make specific findings of both the risk to public safety and the risk of nonappearance, especially when the judge’s order contradicts the recommendation of a pretrial services officer.  (Thanks to Dan Miller for this summary—I would recommend contacting him (danimiller@ipac.in.gov) if you have questions about it, or IRAS-PAT, CR 26, or EBDM issues generally.)

“Strict Liability” Problem-Solving Court Provision in Guilty Plea Was Unenforceable

Holsapple v. State, No. 19A-CR-2069 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/6/20)

Tiffany Holsapple pled guilty to F2 dealing in meth and F6 failure to return to lawful detention.  The agreement recommended a term of 16 years executed at the DOC, but also provided:  “If [Holsapple] graduates from Drug Court, then her sentence shall have stayed permanently.  If [Holsapple] is terminated from Drug Court, then they stay on her sentence shall be lifted, and her sentence, sixteen (16) years to be executed at Indiana Department of Correction, shall be imposed.”  After being transferred from Drug Court to Mental Health Court, Holsapple was terminated from the program for unsuccessfully complying with it.  (It is unclear how or why Holsapple was transferred to Mental Health Court, but the change was legally irrelevant here, as it was still a problem-solving court.)  The trial court concluded that it had no discretion but to require Holsapple to serve the 16 years executed.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing.  It found that it was unclear from the record under what authority Holsapple qualified to be placed into a problem-solving court under Ind. Code 33-23-16-13, but presumed it was as a condition of probation.  “Essentially, Holsapple’s entire sentence was suspended to probation and the condition of her probation was that she successfully complete a problem-solving court program.”  (Note, F2 drug offenses can sometimes qualify as a nonsuspendible offense, and in turn qualify a defendant for participation in a problem-solving court program under Ind. Code 33-23-16-15.)  The Court then concluded that the plea agreement’s “strict liability” provision, i.e. mandating execution of her entire 16-year sentence if she did not successfully complete problem-solving court, was “constitutionally suspect” and unenforceable.  “[C]ontrary to the trial court’s belief that it was required to impose the agreed-upon sanction of full execution of the stayed sentence, a plea agreement cannot bind the trial court’s hands as to an appropriate sanction.  Rather, as in any probation revocation proceeding, the trial court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”

Plea Agreement Referring to “Consecutive” HO Sentence Improper, but Not “Manifestly Unjust”

Kinman v. State, No. 19A-CR-2718 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/27/20)

Brian Kinman signed a plea agreement to F5 possession of a narcotic drug and being a habitual offender in one case and to F6 burglary in another case.  The agreement stated in part:  “Dealing in a Narcotic Drug, 5 felonies. . . 4 years executed; $200 drug interdiction fee; Costs.  Consecutive to:  Habitual Offender . . . 4 years executed . . . .”  The trial court accepted the plea and set a sentencing hearing.  Kinman did not appear at the first sentencing hearing; at the second hearing, he appeared and attempted both to withdraw his plea and asked for a new attorney.  Specifically, Kinman claimed the plea was illegal in that it referred to the HO sentence being served “consecutive” to the F5 dealing sentence, whereas the HO statute and caselaw say that an HO sentence is an “enhancement” of the underlying offense’s sentence and not a “consecutive” sentence.  The trial court denied permission to withdraw the plea and did not allow defense counsel to withdraw.  After the trial court imposed a sentence pursuant to the plea Kinman again attempted to withdraw the plea and set aside the judgment, which the trial court denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.  It concluded Kinman did not suffer a “manifest injustice” by not allowing him to withdraw the plea, nor did he show that his plea was unknowing, given that the practical effect of an HO enhancement is more like a consecutive sentence and not concurrent to the underlying sentence.  Still, the Court said that using the word “consecutive” in a plea agreement when referring to an HO enhancement “unnecessarily confuses the matter, as the statute itself clearly states the habitual offender adjudication is not a separate crime that receives a consecutive sentence. . . .  We advise the State to draft plea agreements that do not violate the language of the relevant statute.”

Juvenile Waived Into Adult Court Has Right to Have Parent in Courtroom during Trial

Harris v. State, No. 19A-CR-1863 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/13/20)

When Byron Harris was 15, he was waived into adult court to face a charge of attempted murder.  At the outset of jury trial, when Harris was 16, the State requested a witness separation order.  This resulted in Harris’s mother being excluded from the courtroom, over Harris’s objection, because she was listed as a State’s witness, though she was never actually called to testify.  Harris was convicted as charged.

The Court of Appeals reversed by a 2-1 vote.  The majority held that Harris’s due process rights were violated by the exclusion of his mother from the trial.  It acknowledged that although a juvenile’s parent is recognized as a “party” under the Juvenile Code and cannot be excluded from the courtroom under a witness separation order in a delinquency proceeding, the Juvenile Code did not apply here because Harris had been waived to adult court.  However, it concluded “the juvenile is still a minor child; the juvenile’s lack of maturity and need for meaningful consultation with a parent regarding the juvenile’s rights remain.  Regardless of the waiver to adult court, our criminal procedures should take into account the juvenile’s youth and need for such meaningful consultation with a parent, especially during a trial.”  As such, the majority deemed a juvenile’s parent to be an “essential person” to the juvenile who cannot be excluded from the courtroom under Ind. Evidence Rule 615(c), even if a witness separation order is entered.  Judge Vaidik dissented on the basis that Harris had never made a Rule 615 argument at trial or on appeal, and in any event, a juvenile waived into adult court should in her view have to make some showing of needing to have his or her parent in the courtroom during the trial, which Harris did not do.

Juvenile and Her Mother Improperly Ordered to Reimburse Secure Detention Costs

F.A. v. State, No. 19A-JV-2438 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/1/20)

F.A. was found to be delinquent on at least 4 occasions for being a runaway and for escape, resisting law enforcement, and unlawfully entering a motor vehicle, and was placed in a problem-solving court program.  Also, after the 4th adjudication, F.A. was placed at Crossroad Child and Family Services.  After she left the facility without permission, her problem-solving court participation was terminated and wardship was awarded to the DOC.  The only evidence at the dispositional hearing regarding F.A.’s or her parents’ financial resources was that her mother was receiving $645 monthly in food stamps.  The juvenile court nonetheless jointly ordered both F.A. and her mother to pay $11,475 in costs for her secure detention.

The Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings.  It noted that regardless of whether the county or DCS was responsible for the costs of F.A.’s secure detention, before a child’s parent can be ordered to reimburse those costs, there must be an inquiry into the parent’s ability to pay them.  (Technically, parental reimbursement of costs where the county had to pay them is governed by Ind. Code 31-40-1-3.8, and where the DCS paid them, Ind. Code 31-40-1-3).  There was no such inquiry here, and the State conceded that the case had to remanded for there to be such an inquiry.  Furthermore, even if a parent is able to pay something, the amount they may be ordered to pay is governed by child support guidelines and worksheets, which were not considered here and would have to be on remand, if the mother was found to be able to pay.  Finally, there was no statutory authority for the juvenile court to order F.A. to pay any part of the costs of her secure detention.

Introduction of Rule 404(b) Evidence Was Not Reversible Error

Echeverria v. State, No. 19A-CR-1459 (Ind. Ct. App. 4/2/20, Ordered Published 5/7/20)

Defendant’s Voluntary Participation in Group “Melee” Precluded Self-Defense Claim

Orozco v. State, No. 19A-CR-2408 (Ind. Ct. App. 4/16/20, Ordered Published 5/11/20)

Delay in Trying Defendant Did Not Violate Interstate Agreement on Detainers

Noelker v. State, No. 19A-CR-2384 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/6/20)

Insufficient Evidence to Identify Defendant as Shooter in Drug-Deal-Gone-Bad

Webb v. State, No. 19A-CR-1358 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/6/20)

Several Challenges to In-Home Daycare Death Involuntary Manslaughter Convictions Rejected

Wahl v. State, No. 19A-CR-2258 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/12/20)

Police Improperly Ignored Invocation of Right to Silence 24 Minutes into Voluntary Interview

Glaze v. State, No. 19A-CR-1735 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/14/20)

Seeing Boxes of Financial Records Not Sufficient Provocation for “Sudden Heat,” Voluntary Manslaughter

Landske v. State, No. 19A-CR-2528 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/14/20)

Polygraph Evidence Properly Admitted Into Evidence, Molestation Conviction Affirmed

Holden v. State, No. 19A-CR-1795 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/20/20)

720-Day Direct Contempt Sentence Did Not Violate Right to Jury Trial

Wine v. State, No. 19A-PC-2268 (Ind. Ct. App. 5/27/20)